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I.
Introduction
When comparing the administration of criminal justice in the
United States and the European Union, a significant difference
quickly becomes apparent: The United States has an elaborate
federal system of criminal justice, whereas the European Union
does not. In Europe, it is still the single member state that is in
charge of criminal prosecution and sentencing and thus providing
security for its citizens. The predominant role of the Member
States in the areas of freedom, security, and justice is illustrated by
the fact that even the European Public Prosecutor-once he is
established-will have to lodge an indictment at the national court
of a member state.' Thus, when talking about European criminal
justice, we do not refer to a European criminal court, nor to a
European code on criminal procedure, but to a rapidly expanding
set of rules governing cooperation in criminal matters.
Correspondingly, the European Union's action in the framework
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters has focused
on initiatives in the area of mutual legal assistance in order to
overcome traditional impediments to transnational criminal law
enforcement.
t Martin B6se is a Professor of Criminal Law, and International and European Criminal
Law at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn. Prior to joining the
faculty at Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn Professor Bose was a
lecturer at the Technical University of Dresden.
I See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 86, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU].
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In the European Union, where citizens can move freely from
one member state to another,2 the transnational enforcement of
criminal law is essential. This is why the smooth functioning of
cooperation in criminal matters has become a key element in the
area of freedom, security, and justice. In order to meet this
challenge, the European Union has replaced the traditional regime
of mutual legal assistance with new cooperative instruments. For
example, the European Arrest Warrant took the place of various
multilateral treaties in the framework of the Council of Europe and
the European Union as well as bilateral agreements between the
Member States.3
These new instruments are based on the principle of mutual
recognition-the idea that a judicial decision made in one member
state can be recognized and executed by the authorities of another
Member State.' Since the Member States of the European Union
share common values and principles (such as rule of law,
democracy, and respect for human rights) the Member States shall
be permitted to trust in the legality of the judgment of another
member state's court.' This principle of mutual recognition is
riddled with many reservations and can be criticized as being
idealistic and as neglecting the fact that the European Union still
faces many differences in its national criminal justice systems,
including different standards.
In the German courts, the provision on convictions in absentia
has emerged as one of the most important exceptions to mutual
recognition.6 The different standards that apply to trials in
See id. art. 21.
3 See Council Framework Decision, 2002/584/JHA, of 13 June 2002, on the
European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, 2002
O.J. (L 190) 1 [hereinafter European Arrest Warrant].
4 Id. art. 1 2
5 Id. prmbl 10
6 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe Jan. 4, 2011, 7
Strafverteidiger 426 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional Court] Kaln Aug. 12,
in Strafsachen und Ober
2010, Entscheidungen der Oberlandesgerichte
2

Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OLGST] LUCHTERHAND WOLTERS KLUWER, 2011, at section 83

IRG No. 4 (Ger.); Kammergericht [Higher Regional Court Berlin] July 16, 2007, 3 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 673, 2008 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional
Court] Karlsruhe July 13, 2007, 1 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT [NStZ-RR] 112, 2008 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht [Higher
Regional Court] Stuttgart Jan. 9, 2008, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT -
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absentia in the Member States are illustrated by the case of
Krombach v. France.'

Dieter Krombach was a German national living in southern
Germany whose second wife had a daughter from a previous
marriage with a French national.' During the summer of 1982, the
daughter was on school holiday at Krombach's home.' One
morning she was found dead in her bedroom.o The German
police conducted an investigation, but found no evidence of
assault." As a consequence, the public prosecutor's office decided
to take no further action in the case.1'2 After the appeal made by
the father of the deceased girl was dismissed, he lodged a criminal
complaint with the French investigating judge in Paris.13 In 1991,
Krombach was charged in France with the crime of assault
resulting in involuntary death. 4 He was summoned for trial, but
did not appear in court; subsequently, he was found guilty and
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in absentia, without his
defence counsel being heard.'" Germany, and later Austria, 6
refused to extradite Krombach to the French authorities.'
In
2001, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR)
stated that the trial in France breached of Article Six of the
Convention." In 2009, Krombach was kidnapped and handed
over to the French police; he is now facing a new trial before a

RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT

[NStZ-RR]

175, 2008 (Ger.).

For an overview on the

relevant national law on trials in absentia in Germany, England, France, the Netherlands
and Austria see Christiane Paul, Erstes Unterkapitel: Das Deutsche Strafprozessrecht,
DAS ABWESENHEITSVERFAHREN ALS RECHTSSTAATLICHES PROBLEM 41 (2007) (Ger.).

7 See Krombach v. France, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 35; see also Case C-7/98,
Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0 1935.
8 See Krombach v. France, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 42-43.
9 Id.
10 Id.

11 Id.
12 Id
13 See Krombach v. France,2011-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 45.
14 Id. at 46.

15 Id. at 48-49.
16 Oberlandesgerichte [OLGSt][Higher Regional Court Innsbruck], Feb. 2, 2000,
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 663, (2000).

17 See Krombach v. France,2011-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 50.
18 Id. at 61.
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French court. 9
Admittedly, the decisions of the French, German, and
European courts on this case were delivered before the principle of
mutual recognition was adopted as the new paradigm of
cooperation in criminal matters. Nonetheless, the case clearly
reveals that blind trust cannot serve as a basis for the transnational
enforcement of criminal law. Reservations such as the ordrepublic-clause and a judicial review in the executing Member State
are still necessary.
The central question remains how to balance mutual trust and
judicial control in the executing (requested) Member State, or in
other words, how to balance the efficiency of transnational
cooperation on the one hand and the rights of the accused on the
other. Harmonizing the rights of the accused can help to find the
balance between these two interests and thereby enhance
cooperation between the Member States. This paper will not
discuss the initiatives to harmonize the rights of the accused as a
whole, but will focus on trials in absentia and the specific function
of harmonisation, i.e., providing a common basis for effective
cooperation between the Member States. To that end, this paper
shall address three different aspects: the concept of mutual
recognition and the role of standard-setting (Part II); the minimum
standard for trials in absentia that can be derived from the caselaw of the ECtHR (Part III); and the standard defined by the
Framework Decision on trials in absentia (Part IV).20
The Principle of Mutual Recognition
II.
The principle of mutual recognition has emerged from the free
movement of goods, persons, and services among various
countries as well as the establishment of the internal European
market.2 1 According to this principle, goods which are lawfully
19 See Kim Willsher, Doctor Loses Fight to Halt Stepdaughter Murder Trial, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2011, at 23.

20 See Council Framework Decision, 2009/299/JHA, amending Framework
Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and
2008/947/JHA, Thereby Enhancing the Procedural Rights of Persons and Fostering the
Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Decisions Rendered in the
Absence of the Person Concerned at the Trial, 2009 O.J. (L 81/24) [hereinafter
Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights].
21 See Fernando Piera, International Electronic Commerce: Legal Framework at
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produced in one Member State cannot be banned from sale in the
territory of another Member State, even if they are produced
according to technical or quality specifications different from
those applied to its own products.2 2 At the Tampere Summit of
October 1999, the European Council transplanted the principle of
mutual recognition to the area of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters. 23 As has been mentioned above, the first
measure implementing this principle is the Framework Decision
on the European Arrest Warrant.
The new paradigm has been subject to severe criticism.2 As a
matter of principle, mutual recognition might apply to goods and
services, but not to measures seriously interfering with the
fundamental rights of the individual such as arrest and search
warrants. 25 Nevertheless, a closer look at the traditional regime of
mutual legal assistance reveals that the idea of mutual recognition
is not alien to international cooperation. 26 On the other hand, the
ambit of mutual trust is still rather limited in the European Union.
International cooperation in criminal matters requires the
States to accept that they will assist each other in criminal
proceedings that will be conducted on the basis of foreign law
(i.e., the law of the requesting State). By extraditing the suspect,
the requested State acknowledges that the proceedings will follow
the lex fori, which might be quite different from its own laws of
evidence, the legal status of the parties, etc. 27 If a state is not
willing to accept this, it will not be afforded legal assistance in its
the Begining of the XXI Century, 10 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L. J. 8, 9 (2001) (describing

the principle of mutual recognition in Europe in the context of electronic goods).
22 See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltun flir
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 645; see also Commission White Paper on Completing the
Internal
Market,
COM
(1985)
310,
available
at
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/whitepapers/pdf/coml985_0310f en.pdf.
23 See Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (Oct. 15-16, 1999).
24 See, e.g., Oliver De Schutter, The Two Europes ofHuman Rights: The Emerging
Division of Tasks Between the Council of Europe and the European Union in Promoting
Human Rights in Europe, 14 COLUM. J.EUR. L. 509, 545-46 (warning that there could be
adverse consequences from mutual recognition in criminal cases).
25 See Steve Peers, Mutual Recognition and CriminalLaw in the European Union:
Has the Council Got it Wrong?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 5, 23-36 (2004).

26 Sabin Glel3, Zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung, 116 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 353, 357 (2004).

27 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 2.
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own proceedings either. So, mutual recognition is deeply rooted
in the principle of reciprocity (do ut des) and is considered an
integral part of international cooperation in criminal matters.
Nevertheless, mutual recognition in international cooperation
is subject to limitations. If the proceedings in the requesting state
are in conflict with the constitutional principles of the requested
state, the latter will refuse to grant legal assistance.2 8 This holds
true for criminal law enforcement in particular because the
accused faces serious interferences with his or her fundamental
rights. As a result, discussion concerning the scope of the ordrepublic-clause focuses on the protection of human rights.
By transferring the principle of mutual recognition to the area
of cooperation in criminal matters, the European Council shifted
the balance towards effective criminal law enforcement.
Importantly, by promoting the idea of mutual trust between
Member States in adoption of the Framework Decision on the
European Arrest Warrant, the European Council abolished
traditional obstacles to extradition. Nevertheless, the impact of the
principle of mutual recognition is rather limited since the
Framework Decision contains the majority of traditional
reservations.29 Thus, mutual recognition does not mean automatic
execution, but simply leaves room for judicial review by the courts
of the requested member state.30
A closer look at the European Arrest Warrant reveals that the
new rules do not significantly change the traditional extradition
regime very much. In essence, the changes are limited to three
aspects.
First, the double criminality requirement has been abolished
for thirty-two categories of crime.' These categories are supposed
to reflect a common understanding of what kind of behavior
28 See id. prmbl. (the agreement does not prevent the application of state
constitutional principles).
29 For example, the Framework Decision allows Member States to refuse to
execute the warrant if the offence is not covered by existing state provisions. European
Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 4 No. 1.
30 See id. art. 6, 2, art. 3-5.
31 See id. art. 2 T 2. Double criminality refers to the traditional requirement that the
crime (for which the accused is to be extradited) is considered a crime in both the
requesting and requested countries. See Heilbronn v. Kendall, 775 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.
Mich. 1991).
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should be considered a criminal offence.32 Yet, because these
categories are not yet fully harmonized, this is not always the case.
Here, the Framework Decision's reliance upon mutual trust
mitigates conflicts between thet national criminal law of the
Member States, as they are all supposed to adhere to the same
fundamental principles, including human rights.
Second, the Framework Decision lifted the ban on extradition
of a requested Member State's nationals (which is deeply rooted in
the constitutions of various Member States).33 This deeply rooted
principle appears to conflict with the prohibition on discrimination
based on nationality.34 Thus, the Framework Decision suggests
that the nationality of the suspect should not protect him from
being prosecuted in the Member State in which the crime was
committed." Therefore, mutual trust between the criminal justice
systems is an essential precondition to a waiver of the
constitutionally guaranteed ban on extradition of a State's own
nationals.
Third, the Framework Decision does not provide for any
exceptions relating to political, fiscal, or military offences.3 6 This
policy is based on rationale similar to that of the double
criminality requirement.
Apart from these three aspects, the traditional obstacles to
extradition still apply to the new regime. The Framework
Decision contains a list of thirteen obligatory and optional grounds
for non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant." This list also
contains a catalogue of the obstacles to extradition originating
from international treaties and national extradition laws of the
Member States.39 Most of those obstacles are intended to protect
the rights of the accused. In the end, this catalogue has become

32 Cf id. art. 2 1 3 (allowing for unanimous action to add new offences to the list).
33 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 4-5.
34 See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 18.
35 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 4.
36 See id

37 Cf id. (stating the various reasons Member States may refuse to extradite).
38 See id. art. 3-5; see also id art. I § 3 for the European ordre public (replacing the
national ordre-public-clauses of the Member States).
39 Compare European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. I § 3 with Council Act,
1996 O.J. (C 313) 11.
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quite extensive. Partially going beyond the ambit of national
extradition law, the implementation of the Framework Decision
triggered the introduction of new obstacles to extradition.
In Germany, this happened with regard to life imprisonment;
although German extradition law does not prohibit the extradition
of a suspect who faces life imprisonment, the German legislature
has implemented the corresponding exception in the Framework
Decision. 40 According to the new provision, the convicted person
shall be entitled to apply for a judicial review of the penalty for up
to twenty years.4 '
Nevertheless, this reservation only applies to the execution of a
European Arrest Warrant, i.e., requests for extradition issued by
another member state. As a consequence, a suspect facing life
imprisonment may be extradited to a non-member state (e.g., the
United States) without a guarantee of a review procedure.4 2 This
result seems at odds with the very idea of mutual recognition and
mutual trust because it implies that Germany has less confidence
in Member States than in non-Member States. Herein lies the
paradox: the more the European Union and its Member States
endeavour to protect human rights, the more they will insist that
these rights be respected by other Member States in cooperation
related to criminal matters.
The distinction between Member States and non-Member
States is due to the fact that Member States have accepted certain
standards as a common basis for cooperation (such as the
European Convention on Human Rights and the Union's Charter
of Fundamental Rights). 43 As a consequence, a Member State
insisting on compliance with these standards cannot be regarded as
40 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 5.

41 Europaisches Halfbefehlgesetz [EuHbG][Act on the European Arrest Warrant],
Jul. 20, 2006, Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette] I at 1721, introducing § 83 No. 4
IRG [Act on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters]; see the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Draft, BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE No. 15/1718, p. 21; see also

Oberlandsgericht [Higher Regional Court] K61n, Apr. 27, 2009, Entscheidungen der
Oberlandesgerichte in Strafsachen und tiber Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OLGST]
LUCHTERHAND WOLTERS KLUWER, 2011, at

42 The

chance

ENTSCHEIDUNGEN

§ 83

of being pardoned
DES

IRG No. 2.

is considered

BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS

to

be

sufficient. See

[BVERFGE]

[Federal

Constitutional Court] June 7, 2005, BVERFGE 2259/04,2 (Ger.).
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/joiningEUROPA,
43 Joining the EU,
eu/index en.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).
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hampering the smooth functioning of cooperation in criminal
matters and should instead be seen as indirectly enforcing the
common standard.
Similar logic applies to a Member State's optional grounds for
refusal, such as life imprisonment. Although a uniform standard is
not yet defined by European Union Law, the Framework Decision
takes up the concerns raised by life imprisonment, favoring a
human rights oriented approach to the new extradition regime.44
By adopting optional grounds for refusal, the European Union is
setting human rights standards by soft harmonization. Member
States are not obliged to amend their legislation on life
imprisonment, but if they refuse to do so, they will risk that
another Member State will insist on the standard adopted in the
Framework Decision and the European Arrest Warrant will not be
executed.45
This approach can be defined as indirect
harmonization.
To sum up, mutual recognition does not call for "blind trust,"
but has to be based on a common standard. The closer the
cooperation, the stricter the standards can be without hampering
the transnational enforcement of criminal law. This reasoning
applies not only to obligatory (minimum) standards, but also to
optional standards (soft harmonization).
III.
Trials in Absentia & Article Six of the ECtHR
Though the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter the Convention) does not explicitly establish a
minimum standard for trials in absentia,4 6 the European Court of
44 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 5 2 (allowing member states to
condition extradition of an accused person that may be sentenced to life in prison on a
harmonized minimum standard).
45 See id.

46 See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (establishing the following rights as
fundamental: (a) adequate "time and facilities" to develop a defence; (b) prompt and
detailed notice of the charges in a language which the defendant understands; (c) the
ability to defend oneself or to choose one's own defence counsel, or be provided counsel
"when justice so requires;" (d) to examine witnesses testifying against the defendant and
present witnesses on one's own behalf, and (e) free interpretation services). For a further
discussion of the matter, see Comm. of Experts on the Operation of the European
Conventions in the Penal Field, Judgments in Absentia, Doc. No. 07E.98 (1998),
http://www.coe.int/ (type 07E.98 in the Advanced Search box; select 07E.98 trial
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Human Rights has on several occasions discussed under what
conditions a trial in absentia can be considered to be compatible
with the right to a fair trial .47
According to the case law of the court, the right to a fair
hearing by a tribunal includes the right to take part in the hearing.48
This right can be derived from the defence rights in Article Six
Section Three of the Convention, which include the right to defend
oneself in person and to examine witnesses, because the accused
cannot exercise these rights without being present. 49 As a
consequence, the accused must be notified of the hearing in order
to exercise his right to take part in the trial."o It is not sufficient for
the defendant to receive indirect notice of the proceedings against
him,"' and "such a waiver must ... be established in an
unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards
commensurate to its importance."s 2
"A waiver of the right. . . must not only be voluntary, but must

also constitute a knowing and informed relinquishment of the
right."" In concrete terms, it is not sufficient that the defendant

absentia) (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).
47 See, e.g., Makarenko v. Russia, App. No. 5962/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 135 (2009)
availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (select "HUDOC database;" and type
in application number) (holding that defendant waived his right to be present at trial
when he terminated his participation and refused to allow his counsel to represent him
mid-trial); Poitrimol v. France, 277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 13 (1993) (holding that due
to failure to appear at an appellate proceeding, the defendant's counsel was prohibited
from representing him, and his appeal from a sentence of one year in prison stemming
from a custody issue was ultimately denied); Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 14, (1985) (convicting defendant in absentia of various crimes leading to
imprisonment, because the Italian police alleged they could not locate him, and finding
that the attempts to locate had been insufficient, citing the fact that the defendant had
been served for other crimes during the time the police had claimed they had been unable
to locate him.).
48 Colozza, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14.
49 Id.
50 See id. (declaring as contrary to Article Six of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms the trial in absentia of a man presumed to
be intentionally evading arrest by authorities merely because they could not locate him).
51 T. v. Italy, 245 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (1992).
52 Poitrimol, 277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1993).
53 Makarenko v. Russia, App. No. 5962/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 135 (2009) available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (select "HUDOC database" and type in
application number.).
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has vague and informal knowledge of criminal proceedings that
have been instituted against him; rather, a waiver requires an
official and precise notification of the charge and the trial.54 To
find that a party has implicitly waived his right to take part in the
trial, the court must find "that he could reasonably have foreseen
what the consequences of his conduct would be."ss
Particular difficulties arise if the accused makes himself
unavailable to be informed of and to participate in the proceedings
in order to escape trial. 6 If the accused has been notified of the
charges and therefore, should reasonably have foreseen the
consequences a conviction in absentia will not violate the right to
a fair trial." According to the court, by seeking to escape trial, the
accused forfeits his right to participate in the hearing." Although
the ECtHR does not consider this conduct as an implicit waiver,
the reasoning (foreseeability of the consequences) is quite
similar."
If the above-mentioned conditions are not met, the trial may
not be held in the accused's absence.6 o A conviction in absentia,
however, does not violate the right to a fair trial if the convicted
person can subsequently obtain from a court, which has heard him,
a fresh determination of the merits of the charge in respect of both
law and fact.6 1 Once again, it is up to the accused to decide
whether to apply for review or to waive the exercise of this right.
In any case, the review proceedings may not be made subject to
the condition that the accused can prove that he was not seeking to
evade justice or that his absence in the trial was due to force

54 T. v. Italy, 245 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42.
55 Makarenko, App. No. 5962(03 Eur. Ct. H.R.
56 For example in Makarenko, the defendant in a libel suit refused continue
participation in the middle of the trial, and terminated his relationship with his three
lawyers, thereby waiving his right to be present. Id.
57 Demebukov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 68020/01, Eur. Ct. H.R.
45-46, 57 (2008)
availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (select "HUDOC database" and type
in application number.).
58 See Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 265-266; Medenica v.
Switzerland, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 119.
59 For a discussion about foresceability of the consequences and implicit waiver,
see Makarenko, App. No. 5962/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 136.
60 See text accompanying notes 50-55.
61 Poitrimol v. France, 277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1993).
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majeure.6
In short, trials in absentia are considered to comply with the
right to a fair trial if the accused has waived or forfeited the right
to be present at the hearing. Regarding the waiver, the reasoning
of the ECtHR is based on the consideration that the Convention
confers individual rights, not obligations.6 3 It is the accused who
decides whether or not to exercise these rights. The waiver, thus,
can be regarded as an integral part of the relevant individual
right.'
The crucial point, however, is whether and under what
conditions the waiver can be considered to be based upon the free
will of the accused. In .this regard, it seems doubtful that an
accused who faces ten years imprisonment (or more) "voluntarily"
waives his right to be present at the hearing when he seeks to
escape trial and imprisonment. Accordingly, the ECtHR has
emphasized in its case law that the absence of constraint is, in all
circumstances, one of the conditions a waiver must meet.65
Furthermore, when the accused faces several years imprisonment,
additional measures must be taken to ensure that the accused is
aware of the consequences of a waiver. What we are facing here
is the problem of legal paternalism. As has been mentioned above,
the ECtHR has held that a waiver must be attended by minimum
safeguards commensurate to its importance.6 6 Shall a person that
has been accused of murder be able to waive his right to be present
at the trial even if he thereby acts against his own interest? Under
what conditions can we allow the defendant to waive the exercise
of this right? 67 Unfortunately, the ECtHR has not elaborated on

62 Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1985).
63 See Van Geyseghem v. Belgium, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 128, 145 (Bonello, J.,
concurring).
64 See generally id. ("What should be discouraged is the transfiguration of a
privilege of the defendant into an onerous responsibility, which divests him of his right
of defence should he choose not to exercise his fundamental right to attend.").
65 Deweer v. Belgium, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1980) (accepting a monetary
settlement under the threat that butcher shop would be closed for an indefinite period).
66 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
67 See generally Poitrimol, 277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (discussing the issue of
requisite appearance in a criminal trial when it leaves the defendant exposed to a warrant
that would lead to his arrest).
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this specific issue with regard to trials in absentia.6 8
Whereas the waiver is based upon the free will of the accused
as to whether to exercise his rights, the forfeiture of the right to
appear acts as a sanction.6 ' The court's concept of forfeiture is
based on the premise that the accused is not only entitled to, but
also obliged to appear at the trial.70 According to the court, this
obligation exists "both because of. . . [the defendant's] right to a
hearing and because of the need to verify the accuracy of his
statements and compare them with those of the victim . .. and of

the witnesses."" But this does not seem to be a convincing
argument because the accused "has an inalienable right to silence,"
and "a mute defendant is almost as productive as an absent
defendant."7 2 Thus, the benefit from an obligation of the accused
to attend the trial is rather limited. On the other hand, as the
analogy to the right to silence reveals, the states are not permitted
to make the right to a fair trial subject to the condition that the

68 For a discussion of the right to waive appearance in a criminal trial, see id. at 13;
see also Colozza, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 15-16; Deweer, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at
25.
69 See generally Van Geyseghem v. Belgium, 1999-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 128, 145
(Bonello, J., concurring).
Article 6 § 3 (c) heralds the fundamental right of the accused "to defend himself
in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing". The Convention
offers a choice to the person accused: to secure his defence either in person or
through legal support. The Belgian system has erased this choice. On appeal,
the defendant must defend himself in tandem with his lawyer, or not defend
himself at all. That system has hijacked from the defendant the options which
the Convention devolves exclusively on him. The State acts as the prosecutor of
the defendant, and also believes itself to be the sole arbiter of his choice of
defence.
Article 6 § 3 (c) is meant to bestow on the defendant an alternative between two
possible courses, both tending to maximise his best defence (and the promotion
of the accused's "best defence" is an imperative constituent of the right to a fair
hearing). He may opt to exercise that right either by appearing in court or by
not appearing; in the first alternative, he may elect to conduct his own defence,
or engage the services of a professional lawyer. In the second, the Convention
allows his defence to be undertaken by a lawyer of his choice.
Id.
70 Id.

71 Poitrimol,277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
72 Van Geyseghem, 1999-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 145 (Bonello, J., concurring).
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defendant gives himself up for arrest.7 3 The guarantees set out in
Article Six of the ECtHR may not be used as a whip to make the
accused appear in court.74
Adhering to the concept of forfeiture might turn out to open a
Pandora's box containing a variety of sanctions against the right to
attend the trial." Although the ECtHR has emphasized that the
national "legislature . . . must be able to discourage unjustified

absences," the sanctions must comply with the principle of
proportionality.7 6 Since the right to be defended by a lawyer is a
fundamental element of a fair trial, the suppression of this right
would be a disproportionate sanction." If the accused is not
present at trial, representation by defence counsel would be the
only chance for the accused to make arguments of law and fact in
response to the charges against him or her." Considering the
crucial importance of the right to be present at the trial and to
defend oneself in-person,79 the reasoning of the ECtHR should
apply to this right as well.
The ECtHR has emphasized the importance of an accused's
presence at trial, arguing that the defendant should appear because
of his or her right to a hearing, which would serve his or her own

73 Poitrimol, 277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13.
74 See Van Geyseghem, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 140 (noting that the right to legal
representation in absence of the accused); Krombach v. France, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 35,
60-62
[T]he fact that the defendant, in spite of having been properly summonsed, did
not appear, could not-even in the absence of an excuse-justify depriving him
of his right under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention to be defended by counsel
(ibid.). It was for the courts to ensure that a trial was fair and, accordingly, that
counsel who attended trial for the apparent purpose of defending the accused in
his absence, was given the opportunity to do so.
Id. at 60. See also Poitrimol, 277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (discussing the right to
appeal).
75 For a more detailed analysis, see K. Gaede, Fairnessals Teilhabe-Das Recht
auf konkrete und wirksame Teithabe durch Verteidigung gemdq3 Art. 6 EMRK, 775 et
seq (Duncker und Humblot Berlin 2007).
76 Poitrimol,277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
77 See id.

78 Id.; Van Geyseghem, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 140.
79 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 46, art. 6.
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interests."o This is, however, a reasoning that is incompatible with

any kind of sanction for the failure to appear in court because this
would turn a legal right into a binding obligation."' The very idea
of an individual right is that it is up to the holder of this right to
decide whether to exercise it or not and to bear the consequences
of that decision. It is contrary to the very idea of individual rights
(and goes far beyond the paternalistic approach that has been
mentioned above) to punish a person for not properly acting in his
or her own interest.
The limitations to the right to be present in court, as construed
by the ECtHR, give rise to serious objections. Nevertheless, it
should be kept in mind that the Convention sets out minimum
standards.8 2 Correspondingly, state parties still have a margin of
discretion when implementing these standards into national law,
and the ECtHR must take this into consideration." Therefore, it
will be up to the national legislature and the European Union to go
beyond these minimum standards in order to strengthen the rights
of the accused.
IV.
The Framework Decision on Trials in Absentia
Due to its relevance in extradition practice, the Framework
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant already provided legal
guarantees relating to trials in absentia.84 In 2009, this provision
was replaced by an amended Framework Decision that specifically
considered

the

"procedural

rights ...

[regarding]

decisions

rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial."85
Although the amended Framework Decision expressly referred to

80 Poitrimol,277 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13.
81 See generally Van Geyseghem, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 140 (arguing that the
presence at trial is established as a waiveable right, rather than an obligation).
82 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 46, art. 53 ("Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to
which it is a Party.").
83 See generally id. (providing that nothing in the agreement shall limit the ability
of parties to establish laws protecting rights in addition to those enumerated).
84 European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 5 § 1.
85 Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, art. 2 (art. 4a
European Arrest Warrant).
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Article Six of the Convention,8 it was not designed to harmonize
national legislation on trials in absentia; rather, it aimed to
redefine the grounds for non-recognition of a European Arrest
Warrant and other cooperation instruments." Nevertheless, by
doing so, the amended Framework Decision triggered indirect
harmonization of national law on criminal procedure.
The amended Framework Decision is closely orientated to the
case law of the ECtHR, but provides more detailed rules for the
conditions under which a conviction in absentia can be considered
to be compatible with the right to a fair trial." In general, the
Framework Decision is based on the principle that trials in
absentia can solely be recognized on the ground that the accused
has unequivocally waived his right to be present at the trial.89 In
order to ensure that an accused's absence can be assumed to be
based upon a voluntary and deliberate decision not to exercise his
right, the Framework Decision requires the accused to be provided
with detailed information.9 0
According to the Framework Decision, the accused can be
assumed to have waived this right if he or she has received official
information of the scheduled date and place of the trial and he or
she was informed that a decision on his or her case may be handed
down if he or she does not appear for the trial.9 ' It must be
unequivocally established that the accused was made aware of the
scheduled trial.92 This will not be the case if the accused has
received the information in a language he or she does not
understand.9 3
Id. prmbl.11.
Id. prmbl. f 4, 6, and 14.
88 See generally id. T 4 ("It is therefore necessary to provide clear and common
grounds for non-recognition of decisions rendered following a trial at which the person
concerned did not appear in person. This Framework Decision is aimed at refining the
definition of such common grounds allowing the executing authority to execute the
decision despite the absence of the person at the trial, while fully respecting the person's
right of defence.")
89 See id. art. 2 1.
90 Id
91 Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, prmbl. 7
and art. 2 11.
92 Id
93 Brozicek v. Italy, 167 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-19 (1989); see also Directive
of 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the
86
87
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In contrast, the Framework Decision does not follow the

reasoning of the ECtHR that an accused who seeks to evade
justice forfeits his or her right to participate in the hearing.94 If a
person who absconds and makes himself or herself unavailable to
be informed of the trial is convicted in absentia, the conviction is
not required to be recognized by another member state, i.e.,
extradition may be refused.
The Framework Decision thereby
acknowledges that the accused may not be deprived of his or her
right to a hearing in order to force him to turn himself or herself in
to police.96 The decision also emphasizes that the waiver must be
based on the free will of the accused. 9 7
Nonetheless, the relevant provision does not expressly state
that the accused's absence during the trial cannot be due to
constraint, i.e., the fear of being arrested and held in custody.98 In
this regard, the Framework Decision missed the opportunity to
provide for more detailed procedural safeguards. Accordingly, the
Framework Decision has been criticized for not making the
presence of the accused obligatory in proceedings relating to
serious crimes. 99 At first glance, such a rule seems to contradict
the very idea of an individual right.'"0 But, making the presence of
the accused obligatory will prevent him from waiving his defence
rights and thereby acting against his own interest.'o' This is
Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings, 2010 O.J. (L 280) 1
[hereinafter Directive].
94 Makarenko v. Russia, App. No. 5962/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 135 (2009) available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (select "HUDOC database" and type in
application number).
95 Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, 12.
96 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, art. 5 § 1.
97 Id
98 Id
99 Stellungnahme des Deutschen Richterbundes [Opinion of the German
Association of Judges] on the draft Framework Decision on the enforcement of
judgments in absentia and amending Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (March 2008)
http://www.drb.de/cms/index.php?id465.
100 See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
101 For the obligatory presence of the accused see THE GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE (section 230), 115-116, (New York University School of Law, pub., Horst
Niebler, trans., 1965), Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Oct. 2, 1952, 3 official Court
reports (BGHSt) 187 (190-191). A translation of the actual version of the German Code
is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-stpo/index.html.
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obviously a rather paternalistic approach. In any case, if
imprisonment for several years is at stake the waiver should be
made subject to additional safeguards (such as legal advice and a
formal requirement of an express waiver before a judge) in order
to ensure that the waiver is based on a voluntary and well-

considered decision.10 2
In practice, however, these concerns can be expected not to
become relevant: A person accused of a serious crime will be
arrested and, thus, be present at the trial, or else the accused will
have managed to escape before being arrested. In that case, the
authorities will not be able to inform him of the scheduled trial
and, as a consequence, a trial in absentia will not comply with the
standard of the Framework Decision.
A waiver of the right to a hearing can be derived not only from
the deliberate absence of the accused, but also from a mandate to a
defence counselor as well.'03 Accordingly, the accused must be
aware of the scheduled trial when instructing a legal counselor to
defend him at the trial. The waiver must be based upon the free
will of the accused, and the accused must have deliberately chosen
to be represented by a legal counselor, rather than appearing in
person at the trial.'04 Therefore, a waiver cannot be established in
an unequivocal manner when the accused has given a mandate to
his counselor in order to be considered represented at trial yet does
not appear in court out of fear of arrest.i'0
If the trial does not meet the conditions set out above, the
accused should be granted a retrial or an appeal.' 6 In both forums,
the accused has the right to participate and to have the merits of
his case reexamined. 0 7
Despite some ambiguities in the language of the Framework
Decision, its substantial requirements are compatible with the
minimum standards of the European Convention on Human
Rights.'" While the Framework Decision goes beyond these
102 See Directive, supra note 93, art. 3 § 8.
103 See Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, art.2

1 1.

104 Id. prmbl.1 10.

105 Id. art. 4 (ii).
106 See id. art. 2 I (Art. 4a (1)(c)-(d) European Arrest Warrant).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
108 See supra Part III for a discussion of the minimum standards set forth under the
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standards by rejecting the concept of forfeiture,'" it does not
provide the procedural safeguards of a waiver. "10
Apart from this criticism, there are two more critical points.
First, the Framework Decision defines optional grounds for nonexecution of a European Arrest Warrant."' Since the standard
defined in the Framework Decision is mainly based upon the case
law of the ECtHR" 2 it should not be up to the member state to
decide whether to abide by this standard or not."' For example, a
violation of the right to be present at the trial ought to be a
mandatory ground for refusal." 4
The second point relates to the provision in the Framework
Decision whereby an executing Member State is obliged to
surrender a suspect if served with a European Arrest Warrant
which states that the conditions set out above are met."' This
provision contains an inherent reliance on the principle of mutual
recognition, under which the assurance of the issuing Member
State should be sufficient."l
This mechanism has been subject to severe criticism.'"
Opponents to this provision argue that the issuing Member State
should not assess whether its own proceedings are in conformity
with the right to a fair hearing in court, as the standard is likely to
European Convention.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 103-107.
111 See Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, art. 2 l
(Art. 4a (1) European Arrest Warrant) (noting that "[t]he executing judicial authority
may . . . refuse to execute the European arrest warrant. . . .").
112 See ED CAPE ET AL.,

SUSPECTS IN EUROPE: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT THE

INVESTIGATIVE STAGE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9-10 (Ed Cape

et al. eds., Intersentia Antwerpen-Oxford 2007).
113 See Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, prmbl. 1
14-15 (discussing the limitations of the non-recognition policy).
114 See id. prmbl. 1 15 (stating that a violation of the right to be present at trial is
only an optional grounds for refusal).
115 See id. art.2T1.
116 See id. prmbl. 6.
117 See, e.g., Briefing Note: EU Strengthens Trials in Absentia - Framework
Decision Could Lead to Miscarriages of Justice (Open Europe, Working Paper,
September 3, 2008), available at http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/#JHA (select
"Justice, home affairs and migration" hyperlink; then select "EU strengthens trials in
absentia" hyperlink).
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be abused." 8 They argue that the executing country should have a
"margin of discretion" to ensure "fundamental procedural rights"
of its citizens.'19
This criticism, however, is without merit. The obligation to
execute the European Arrest Warrant requires more than simply
"ticking a box."' 2 0 A closer look at the form reveals that the
issuing authority has to provide information about how the
conditions set out in the Framework Decision have been met. 121
This obligation implies that the executing authority reviews the.
assessment of the issuing authority, and therefore it would make
no sense to read it as requiring authorities to tick the box.12 2
Additionally, as regards the execution of convictions, the
Framework Decision contains a consultation mechanism whereby
the executing state is required to "consult the competent authority
in the issuing State, by any appropriate means" before "deciding
not to recognize and execute a decision." 23 Therefore, an
executing Member State is not without recourse when protecting
the rights of an individual.12 4
Furthermore, both the issuing and the executing Member
States are responsible for ensuring respect for the rights of the
accused.125 The Framework Decision clearly states that it "shall
not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect
fundamental rights . . . including the right of defence." 2 6 As the
European Court of Justice stated, "Fundamental rights form an
integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the
ECtHR ensures" drawing inspiration from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines
supplied by international treaties for the protection of human
118 See id. at 9-10.
119 See id.

120 See id. at I (arguing that checking a wrong box could compel a country to hand
over a person).
121 See Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, art. 2 1 3.
122 See id.
123 See id. art. 3

2.

124 See id. prmbl. 15 (stating that "[t]he grounds for non-recognition are optional"
and then emphasizing the intent of the Framework Decision to "enhance the procedural
rights of persons and to facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal matters.").
125 See id art. I 2.
126 Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, art. I 2.
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rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which
Simply stated, the intention of the
they are signatories.'2 7
Framework Decision is to improve judicial recognition between
Member States, which necessitates both sides having a voice. 128
Despite some ambiguities the Framework Decision on trials in
absentia is a step forward because it establishes, at least in part, a
standard that goes beyond those developed by the European
Convention.' 2 9 Nevertheless, this small step does little to enhance
the rights of the accused and leaves the Member States responsible
for ensuring that the right to be present at the hearing is
respected.' 30
V.
Conclusion
Although the principle of mutual recognition has become a
cornerstone of ensuring "the creation of an area of freedom,
security and justice," the implementation of this principle is only
just developing in the European Community."' Since the process
is still in its beginning stages, the Member States cannot be
expected to rely on "blind trust" nor to "automatically" execute the
request of another Member State. To ensure its successful
application, Member States should utilize standards and review
procedures upon which trust can be built.'32
Indirect harmonisation is one way to facilitate the development
of a common standard, whereby the national legislature retains the
right to either adapt the national code of criminal procedure or
trust that the courts of other Member States will execute decisions
compatible with its standard.'3 3 The Framework Decision on trials
in absentia illustrates the success of this approach, which allows
Member States to retain much of their procedural autonomy.134

127
128
129

See Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.J. 1-1956 25.
See Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, art. I
See supra text accompanying notes 994-102, 109-110.

1.

130 See Framework Decision: Enhanced Procedural Rights, supra note 20, prmbl. 1J
14-15 (discussing the limitations of the non-recognition policy and stating that the
"grounds for non-recognition are optional").
131 See CAPE ET AL., supra note 112, at 2-4.
132 See id. (discussing standards and review procedures).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
134 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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While this might help to overcome Member States' opposition to
harmonising national legislation on criminal proceedings, the
impact of optional standards (soft harmonisation) is limited. 13 5
In order to take human rights seriously, the European Union
will have to overcome Member States' reluctance to abolish
national peculiarities that dramatically interfere with citizen's right
to a fair trial. The trial in absentia example illustrates that a
common standard can be derived from the European Convention
on Human Rights and the case law of the ECtHR.13 6 By
committing to enhance the rights of the accused, the European
Union must establish a mandatory standard that considers the
minimum standard of Article Six of the Convention, which
effectively guaranteeing the right to be present at the hearing.

135 See supra text accompanying note 45. It should also be noted that leaving
implementation up to the Member States favors different national standards and thus
hampers a smooth functioning of the new cooperation mechanisms.
136 See supra text in Part III for a discussion of this point.

